Tragedy of the Commons

Tragedy of the Commons: self interest in competition can cause people to ruin a shared resource.

The current state of the environment is an example of a transnational issue. It is a problem that must be addressed collectively as individual nations do not have the capability to effect lasting reforms. I think the tragedy of the commons highlights just how much politics and psychology overlaps; in order to resolve the political issue of the environment, the psychology of the actors involved must be understood. This is an area of study in which the ideas of the the constructivist and liberal schools of thoughts would flourish.

Kashmir

Kashmir has been disputed territory between India and Pakistan since the 1947 partition. Kashmir, like old Germany, has been split into two; one side is administered by the Indians and the other by the Pakistanis. Though the Pakistani side of Kashmir is nothing to write home about, the Indian side has long been criticized for its constant violation of human rights and, as is the case in Palestine, there are may instances of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Kashmiris themselves dream of autonomy, while some (fewer by comparison) wish to become a part of Pakistan as was supposed to happen prior to the split. This part of the Subcontinent has long been an area of war and strife and the situation has seemingly reached a standstill.

Photo from Al Jazeera

OPEC is a typical example of an intergovernmental organization. Created in the 1960s, it consists of 12 member states: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., and Venezuela. A characteristic held in common by all members is that they are net exporters of oil.

 

(Map of OPEC member states)

Article 2 of the OPEC Statute states that “the principal aim of the Organization shall be the coordination and unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively.”

As is the case with most inter governmental organizations, OPEC is far from being democratic. Many of the member states are blatantly authoritarian while others are only representative democracies in name, so the question of representing the member states’ constituencies does not even arise.

Over the past decades OPEC has demonstrated its ability to directly influence global oil prices. For instance, in 1973 during the October War (in which the belligerents were Israel, Egypt and Syria. Egypt regained the Sinai peninsula, and Syria reclaimed parts of the Golan Heights from Israeli occupation). The OPEC “Arab oil embargo” targeted states that supported Israel, and this was what precipitated the 1973 oil crisis, in which production was slashed by 5% the price of oil quadrupled.

The 1973 embargo is testament to how influential intergovernmental organizations can be if they act decisively as a unit. States find mutually beneficial to form strategic alliances with other nations that, for the time being, share the same goals. OPEC as an organization grants its member states far more influence in the political and economic spheres than any one state would have enjoyed individually.

Flouting International Law

Since its establishment ten years ago, the Guantanamo Bay detention camp has become a focal point of international criticism. Referred to as the “gulag of our times” by Irene Khan, former Secretary General of Amnesty International, these sites have become notorious over the past decade for their flagrant and repeated violation of international law and human rights:

“Guantánamo has come to symbolize 10 years of a systematic failure by the USA to respect human rights…The US government disregarded human rights from day one of the Guantánamo detentions. As we move into year 11 in the life of the detention facility, this failure continues.”

The the first batch of detainees, captured during the process of invading Afghanistan and Iraq, were denied rights under the Geneva Conventions which uniformly guarantees prisoners of war basic dignities (minimum rights granted in 2006). As time went on, facts emerged that implicated the U.S. in torture, a practice which had to eventually be proclaimed and denounced by government officials once international outrage compelled them to do so. Organizations such as Physicians for Human Rights assert that doctors under the employ of the CIA may have violated laws established during the Nuremberg Tribunals:

Doctors actively monitored the CIA’s interrogation techniques with a view to determining their effectiveness, using detainees as human subjects without their consent. The report concludes that such data gathering was “a practice that approaches unlawful experimentation”.

Human experimentation without consent has been prohibited in any setting since 1947, when the Nuremberg Code…voluntary consent of subjects is essential and that all unnecessary physical and mental suffering should be avoided.

The Geneva conventions also ban medical experiments on prisoners and prisoners of war, which they describe as “grave breaches.”

On January 23, 2012, the United Nations human rights chief Navi Pillay stated that “individuals remain arbitrarily detained [at Guantanamo]…in clear breach of international law.”

Case Study: Caracas

The 2002 protests in Caracas that thwarted a coup, and reinstated Hugo Chaves as the President of Venezuela, were an example of direct mass public influence on the international political system. On April 11 certain elements of the the military detained the popularly elected and incumbent Chavez, replacing him with Pedro Carmona who in his 48 hour rule dissolved the constitution, the Supreme Court, and the National Assembly in its entirety. An estimated 150,000 Chavez supporters organized and flooded the streets of Caracas demanding their president’s release and the restoration of the government. The key factor, however, was the fissure this event created among the uniformed ranks. The faction of the military that was loyal to Chavez refused to follow orders; Tariq Ali reports, they refused all commands ranging from firing on civilians to playing the national anthem for the newly inaugurated president:

 

“A General came out of the palace and spoke to the military band. He informed them that a new President was about to come out and they should play the national anthem as per usual. The soldiers questioned his orders. Angered by the disobedience, the General turned to the young bugler, an eighteen-year-old soldier and instructed him to blow the bugle as he saw the new President. ‘Excuse me General, but which President do you speak of? We only know of one. Hugo Chavez.’ The furious General told the bugler to obey orders. At this point the bugler handed his instrument to the General and said: ‘You seem to be keen on playing the bugle. Here it is. You play it.’[...] The combination of popular upsurge and the threat of soldiers’ mutiny saw the triumphal return of Chavez.”

 

This case study is testament to the fact that ordinary people have the potential, and the opportunity, as rare as it may be, to directly affect and influence the international political environment. The reinstatement of Chavez in 2002 has had significant regional and international consequences. Surely, if the coup had succeeded, the Venezuelans would have inhaled the sent of roses at the UN in 2006, not the stench sulphur.

For a more informed perspective on the subject I would invite my reader to watch “The Revolution Will Not be Televised,” by Kim Bartley and Donnacha O’ Briain:

Pluralism at Play

Recent developments related to the Keystone XL pipeline project demonstrate that grass roots movements and organizations have the potential to bring their influence to bear on the decision making process. This was made clear by the Obama administration’s decision to reject, for the time being, TransCanada’s application seeking project approval. This was largely due to the popular opposition mounting against the project, and Obama’s hesitation to further alienate his already discontented constituency, who he relies on for re-election.

The diagram of the Pluralist model (Fig. 5.4) on pg.142  in Mingst’s, “Essentials of International Relations” identifies four sectors that have the ability to influence the decisions of the state:

1. Interest groups
2. Multinational corporations
3. Public opinion
4. Mass movements

These four sectors do not have equal influence on the decision making process; interest groups and corporations have a disproportionately large amount of influence on the decisions of the state. In a rare display, however, public opinion and mass movements managed to direct and control the decision making process in Keystone XL’s case, much to the dismay of corporations, interest groups, and the Harper regime.

Theory & Application: Holders of Balance

What does Morgenthau mean by the “holder” of the balance?

 

Theory

According to Hans Morgenthau’s article, “The Balance of Power”, the “holder” of balance is essentially a nation state that intentionally pursues strategic isolation in order to achieve its primary goal: the maintenance of the balance of power within the political system.  Characteristics of such a nation would include shifting foreign policies, and the calculated formation and severance of alliances. The “balancer” nation(s) is guided by the “relative position of the scales” of power in the global system (each scale housing states that have united upon a point of common interest). The scale is balanced by the holder in order to maintain the peace. If diplomacy fails and war ensues, the balancer nation can ally itself with the nation that provides the most favorable terms and see to a decisive victory. Whatever the outcome of the war, the holder is able to “exact the highest price from those whom it supports”. It restores the balance, whilst simultaneously pursuing its national interests, thus, Morgenthau claims, such a nation is in “splendid isolation”. The holder of balance does not have any natural or permanent allies, nor does it have any permanent enemies.

Morgenthau identifies 3 ways in which the holder of balance is able to exercise power:

1. Making the cost of their alliance the reestablishment of the balance of powers.
2. Making the cost of peace the restoration of balance.
3. Guaranteeing the fulfillment of national policy objectives while retaining the position of the holder.

Note: It is important to clarify that Morgenthau’s article, “The Balance of Power” refutes the theory as presented above. He argues that nations seek to increase relative power, and rejects the idea that the balance constitutes an equilibrium. Therefore, Morgenthau was an opponent of the view, not a proponent.

 

Application

I will put forth two cases to illustrate how the theory of balancing is applied within a continental context, and an inter-continental context. The example of the former is Great Britain (as mentioned in the article), and of the latter is America.

Great Britain is often cited as being the holder of balance, and is said to pursue such a policy in continental Europe since the 1500s. Being an island off the coast of coast of Europe, Britain has complimented its geographic isolation with a type of political isolation as well. In modern times, it claims to favor the EU, but keeps it at arm’s length; this is illustrated by its refusal to adopt the Euro. This is what splendid isolation would look like on a continental level. The accusation against Britain is that it keeps the continent divided in order to maintain dominance over it. The British throw their weight behind European nations that are not opposed to Britain’s national policy objectives. This attitude has given the British a notorious reputation among the Europeans, who view them as being “fickle” and difficult allies. Britain aims to prevent any one European nation from commanding too much power on the continent. This stance is hardly surprising in the shadow of recent European history.

The second, and inter-continental case, is the United States. Although the U.S. does not hold the status of a permanent balancer in the international system, as it more often than not plays the role of a hegemon, the States has acted as a balancer in the past. More precisely, it pursued a policy of “offshore balancing”. An example of this would be operation “Desert Shield” (August 1990) and “Desert Storm” (January 1991), during the First Gulf War, in which American forces drove out Saddam’s forces from Kuwait. The irony of the situation lies in the fact that the U.S. had supported Saddam’s war against the newly formed Iranian regime after the 1979 revolution, as America too saw Iran’s newly acquired power as a threat to U.S. interests, and regional status quo. However, once Saddam set his sights on the oil fields, and declared Kuwait to be a province of Iraq, American interests were directly being threatened, and direct action by way of force was required by the U.S. Saddam seemed to have miscalculated the amount of power America would allow him to possess in the region. One of the traits of a balancer nation is the strategic formation, and severance of alliances, which is clearly illustrated by U.S. policy towards Iraq. This is a typical case of offshore balancing, as the U.S. did not remove Saddam from power (not for the time being at least); they simply pushed his army back into Iraqi territory, and restored the balance of power. In this case, America was the holder of balance; it essentially decided the outcome of the conflict, while pursuing its own national interests, and simultaneously reestablishing the balance within the region.

Realism: A Game the Ayatollahs Play Well

I would like to analyze the rationale of Iran’s foreign policy through the lens of realism; more specifically, I will attempt to explain Iran’s behavior by way of applying John Mearsheimer’s theory of “offensive realism” (expanded on in my last post, “Exploring Realism“). Furthermore, I will rely heavily on the foreign policy strategy articulated by Mohsen Milani, in his article: “Tehran’s Take” (Foreign Affairs; Jul/Aug2009, Vol. 88 Issue 4, p46-62, 17p).

Iran is often portrayed as being an irrational actor in international politics. Most Canadian media and Western media in general, more often than not, provide audiences with sensational and superficial coverage, suggesting that Iran is a rouge state, genocidal, and suicidal, with whom diplomacy and negotiations are futile. There is little, if no depth to the analysis that is being prepared and presented to the general public; this is done consciously and there is a concerted effort, by the advertising laced, sound bite, 24-hour, corporate media culture, to maintain this status quo. The black turbaned mullahs and the ayatollahs are purported to being radicals that are ideologically predisposed to unwarranted aggression; however, close examination of Iran’s foreign policy shows that its’ grand strategy is meticulously formulated, and that realism is a game the Ayatollahs play well.

Milani argues that, in reaction to the U.S.’s containment/isolationist strategy, Iran is currently pursuing a strategy that consists of two major components:

Deterrence and Counter-Containment.

In order to clarify why Iran feels the need to deter and counter-contain one need only go back to the 1950s in order to understand the underlying cause of both anti-American and anti-Iranian rhetoric, and the tragic breakdown of diplomatic relations. The allegedly democratically elected President Mohammad Mosaddeq was overthrown in a coup, orchestrated by American and British intelligence agencies in 1953, for nationalizing national energy resources (oil reserves: 138.4 billion barrels, natural gas reserves: 26.5 trillion cubic meters). The subsequent and unforgiving rule of the last Shah (Reza Pahlavi) would deepen resentment towards American regimes, as Palavi’s iron fist was forged and funded by U.S. tax dollars. Following the pivotal 1979 revolution, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power, the westward armies of Saddam waged an American encouraged and funded conventional and chemical war against Iran. These decades old events weigh heavily on the psyche of the Iranian regime. During the last decade, the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and then Iraq in 2003 placed American troops to Iran’s east and west. There are large bases in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, which houses the U.S. Fifth Fleet. There are nuclear-armed war ships afloat in the Gulf, and espionage drones violating Iranian air space (one of which was compromised just recently). To complicate the political landscape further, Iran has been subject to sanctions for years, which have intensified over the past few weeks, for alleged suspicions surrounding its nuclear program. Furthermore, the west actively funds separatist groups such as Jundallah and other organizations that may assist in the destabilization of the current regime. These issues and disputes have contributed to the volatility of the present situation in which civilian scientists are being assassinated, economic sanctions are being tightened, accusations of trying to kill foreign ambassadors are being made, and Iran is threatening to close the Straits of Hormuz. The chaotic nature of the political environment often makes a nation’s grand strategy difficult to discern. However, in the case of Iran, there clearly is one, and it has been more or less consistent since the revolution of 1979 (some argue that the policies have not changed much even post 1979).

 

Deterrence

In his Foreign Affairs article, Milani describes a deterrence strategy that has four components:

1.     “The means to fight asymmetric, low-intensity war, inside and outside [Iran]”: The Revolutionary Guards wished to improve Iran’s retaliatory capabilities in case of an escalation in tensions. As a result, Iran has trained its conventional army to transform itself into a non-conventional guerrilla army, equip with assault boats and motorbikes mounted with light machine guns. Iran wants to have the ability to damage U.S. interests in the region if it has to.

2.     “The modernization of weapon systems”: Because of the restrictions placed on the regime by the embargo, a state funded local military industrial complex has formed. The jobs it provides contribute to the increasing pressure to indigenize arms production.

3.     “The development of indigenous missile and antimissile systems “: Technical support is provided by Russia and China to advance Iran’s missile technology.

4.     “Strategic ambiguity with regards to the nuclear program”: Iran uses its nuclear program as a tool. It is used as a bargaining chip in international politics and it seeks to deter and discourage potential opponents. It is highly likely that Iran will want to be in the same position as countries like Japan, where there is no preexisting nuclear stockpile, yet there is a capability to weaponize if there is a perceived need.

 

Counter-Containment

America’s efforts to contain and isolate Iran have had more damaging an effect than the Iranian regime likes to admit, but the impact has been significantly less than what Washington had hoped for. This is largely due to the counter-containment policy implemented by Tehran. Milani describes it as having three components:

1.     “Create a wedge between the U.S. and its’ European allies”: Iran has attempted to increase economic ties with Europe in hopes that some of the criticism will be deflected, or the rhetoric softened, by perusing a degree of interdependence with the EU. The Europeans are seen to be a “counterweight” the United States. Around 2009 almost a quarter of Iran`s international trade was done with the EU nations. Milani points out that, this tactic has not worked at effectively as Tehran had hoped as the Europeans have supported America in most of the votes at the UN that target Iran.

2.     “Move closer to states that can counter balance the U.S.“: Iran has managed to find common ground with Russia and China, and has proceeded to sign a number of economic and military contracts. It has upgraded its status in the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization“, in which, the parties included in the agreement would be obligated to provide assistance to an allied nation under siege. Furthermore, Iran has gone around the world strengthening diplomatic ties with countries in various religions of the globe (Venezuela, Russia, China, Cuba, and Brazil).

3.     “Reward allies with energy resources and contracts“: Iran has long been known for its good fortune with regards to raw materials. The abundance of natural gas and oil, as mentioned earlier, has helped Iran remain relatively stable despite sanctions. Iran uses “Oil Diplomacy” to achieve its goals. As noted in the article, “before 1979… the top five importers Iranian oil were… France, West Germany, UK, Italy, and Japan. By 2008, they were, Japan, China, South Korea, and Italy”. This shows that Iranian oil flows towards national interests.

 

Iran’s foreign policy can be best understood if examined under a framework of realism. If this is done, it would explain Iran’s pattern of forming alliances around the world. It would certainly explain Iran’s increasing emphasis on developing the capability to use force. Furthermore, it would explain why Iran is trying to strengthen alliances in South America.

Iran is attempting to find its place in the “balance of powers”, a realist concept, by forming economic and military ties with China and Russia (whom Iran has historically opposed). Realists tend to emphasize the use of force, or at least the capability to use it, and Iran’s indigenization of missile programs and local military industrial complex seems to reflect this realist tendency. Iran has gone into the American hemisphere to form alliances with nations like Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The concept of offensive realism, articulated by John Mearsheimer, states that states try to become regional hegemons by preventing the rise of other independent regional hegemons. America is trying to prevent the rise of Iran, and in turn, Iran is trying to sway nations in America`s hemisphere in hopes to simultaneously create a threat and a deterrent in a region where the U.S. is uncontested. Tehran realizes that perusing nuclear arms outright would be foolhardy and counterproductive. This is because an arms race in the region will lead to many of the smaller and comparatively richer Arab states to peruse nuclear arsenal; consequently, Iran’s physical and conventional advantage in force would become useless. Therefore, from a realist perspective, Iran’s decision to remain strategically ambiguous seems an appropriate approach. Iran, in contrast to the U.S., intends to maintain capability, rather than stockpile.

The foreign policy or grand strategy of Iran seems entirely rational if examined under the scope of realism. There is not much evidence of ideologically driven irrationality in the over arching policy of Iran, despite rhetoric from Irani politicians that may suggest otherwise. The core principles of the foreign policy can only be altered by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameni, and it has remained consistent since 1979.

In summary, the foreign policy of Iran is a combination of Deterrence and Counter-Containment. It is a policy that can be made sense of if one approaches it from a realist perspective, specifically through the framework of an objective realist.

Exploring Realism

I would like to elaborate on, by way of citing key thinkers in the field, the theory of ‘Realism’ as presented in Jack Snyder’s article “One World, Rival Theories.” Realism is a lens, one of many, through which political scientists can observe, and make sense of, the events unfolding before them. Noteworthy proponents of realism can be found as far back as Sun Tzu, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Thucydides. The realist theory asserts that states essentially play a primary role on the international political stage. Therefore, before analyzing the theory further, it would be instructive to define the term ‘state’. I believe Francis Fukuyama provides an apt and concise working definition by describing the state as “a centralized source of authority that is able to concentrate power and to use it to enforce rules over a defined territory. The state is all about the concentration and the use of power. Thus the rule of law is to constrain and legitimize this power.” (Fukuyama – Johns Hopkins SAIS Events) It is these sovereign entities that compete for power in an anarchical global political system in pursuit of perceived national interests.

John Mearsheimer describes realism as having three core components:

1. The state is the prime decider in the international arena, in that there is no sovereign authority above the state to which it is loyal, or to which it may turn in order to seek justice or redress
2. States seek to implement foreign policies that lead to the ‘balancing of power’. Often policy is assessed by the standard of how the state’s position will be impacted in the international political system.
3. The utilization of force as a tool, or extension of foreign policy is given special attention. Realists are acutely aware of the role military power plays in international politics, in both an offensive and defensive manner.

Realists often look down on the inter-dependence and the inter-linking of states as promoted by the liberal schools of thought, since the ‘allies’ of today may form the ‘axis’ or tomorrow. For the realist, alliances are purely functional, and should be honored insofar as they are congruous with the national interests of that time. Thus, self-sufficiency and state autonomy is stressed and highly valued by the realist camps, of which there are varieties. I appeal again to the work of John Mearsheimer in order that the distinctions between the three main sects of realism can be clarified.

Human Nature Realists:

This variation of realism is attributed to Hans Morgenthau, who believed that that states have, intrinsic to them, the urge to usurp power. He saw this to be part of a state’s innate nature. Morgenthau claims that “the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.”  (Morgenthau, 1987, p.5.). Some of Morgenthau’s critics argue that he failed to produce a coherent definition of what he means by ‘power’, thereby limiting the scope of his argument (Morgenthau, Realism, and the Scientific Study of International Politics). This theory is based on the objectionable assumption that humans are aggressive by nature, and that they conquer despite themselves.

Defensive Realists:

These theorists assert that states act aggressively because of the anarchic nature of the global political system. They claim that states are forced to assert their position on the global stage in order to ensure their survival. The state is in pursuit or power in order to attain security by which it will maintain the integrity of its sovereignty and autonomy. The best way to attain this goal is to attain and assert power strategically in order to pursue national interests. Defensive realists acknowledge that ‘over-reach’, or an excess of power can actually be detrimental. Once threats to the state’s autonomy and security are eliminated, the state retreats back into its natural territory. This school of thought is attributed to scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, and Stephen Walt, both of whom have been against America’s interventionist policies.

Offensive Realists:

This faction of realist theory, often attributed to John Mearsheimer, asserts that states seek hegemony over the international political system. They do this out of the belief that the accumulation of power itself acts as a deterrent to potential future challengers. This sketches a much more aggressive portrait of the state than does Waltz. Mearsheimer holds that it is impossible for anyone state to project power globally in a manner that would truly let them control the world, as the continuous projection of power over a space as vast as the oceans is simply not an economically feasible option. Thus, Mearsheimer claims, a power like the Unites Stated imposes influence on the global political order by remaining the only regional hegemon, and preventing the rise of other regional hegemons around the world. He argues that if America allowed another regional hegemon to rise, and there were no local competitors to keep it pre-occupied, that new regional hegemon would then have the power and opportunity to turn its attention to the Western hemisphere, in which America is the uncontested hegemon. This type of behavior could expose an opening in America’s armor, as there is currently no country in the western hemisphere that poses a threat to the United States, and this is a state of affairs that it [America] would like to maintain. Therefore, the aim according to the offensive realists is to secure regional hegemony, and prevent the rise of other such regional powers, in order to maintain influence and dominance over the international political system. (Conversations with History – John Mearsheimer)

Finally, it is important to mention that realism is a theory that refrains from making moral distinctions between states. They hold that all states, regardless of ideology act in the same self-interested manner within the anarchic global political system. As John Mearsheimer states, “they [states] are black boxes that act the same way.” Realists do not take stock in terms such as ‘good states’ or ‘bad states’, they make no such distinctions.

It is clear, therefore, that realism is an umbrella term that is used to describe a family of theories (three of which are described above) that share a root ideology primarily that the main actors on the international political stage are states, who are each competing for power. According to some it is because of innate nature, whole others argue that is for the purpose of security, while still, others argue that it is in pursuit of regional, and global political hegemony, yet all agree it is in the name of national interest.